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1. Introduction 
After the collapse of communist and socialist regimes at the beginning of 1990s, a number of 
Central and Eastern European (CEE) economies started their journey into capitalism by establishing 
private property and capital markets. As a result, a number of stock markets have been established 
in the region. Since then they displayed considerable growth in size and degree of sophistication. 
CEE stock markets attracted interest of academics due to a number of reasons.  
Firstly, these markets provided a possibility to re-examine existing asset pricing models and 
pricing anomalies in the conditions of the evolving markets. Market efficiency of the CEE markets 
is tested in Ratkovicova (1999) and Gilmore and McManus (2001); a version of CAPM is tested in 
Charemza and Majerowska (2000); Mateus (2004) explores the predictability of the European 
emerging market returns within an unconditional asset-pricing framework while the January pricing 
anomaly is studied in Henke (2003). 
Secondly, in the light of growing interdependencies between world equity markets due to 
enhanced capital movements, numerous studies investigated the extent to which emerging European 
stock markets are integrated with global markets, and the extent to which they are subjects to global 
shocks (Gelos and Sahay, 2000; Gilmor and McManus, 2002; Scheicher, 2001). Among the CEE 
markets, those of the Vysegrad countries (Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic) have attracted 
most of the attention of the academics due to their economies faster growth relative to their regional 
counterparts (Slovakia, Slovenia, Bulgaria, Croatia and Baltic countries), in addition to political 
stability and their (successfully realised) prospects of joining the European Union. 
The repercussions of the Russian currency and debt crises for the world stock markets have 
been extensively discussed in the literature (see, among others, Baig and Goldfain, 2000; Gelos and 
Sahay, 2000; Hernández and Valdés, 2001; Dungley et al., 2003). However, as far as we are aware, 
no studies have been done on linkages shared by this market after 1998. This lack of research is 
surprising. Firstly, Russia is the largest among the CEE stock markets in terms of market 
capitalization. Secondly, the Russian economy remains important for the Eastern European region. 2 
Although trade links have declined significantly since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia still 
remains an important trading partner for the Vysegrad countries, as well as a source of significant 
direct investment in the region (Jochum, Kirschgässner and Platek, 1998; UNCTAD, 2004a; 2004b; 
2004c). Thirdly, a number of studies have shown that the nature market linkages is time-varying 
(Bekaert and Harvey, 1995; 1997). Gelos and Sahay (2000) suggest that “…the reaction of the more 
advanced financial markets in the region around the time of the Russian ruble collapse suggests 
that further financial market liberalization, … and integration may result in higher future financial 
market comovements”. Thus the aim of the paper is to investigate and document the changing role 
of the Russian stock market for the CEE markets and to explore whether its importance for the 
regional markets has changed after the 1998 crisis. The paper also explores its linkages with the 
developed markets (US, UK, EMU and Japan), with a special emphasis on the post-crisis period. 
Increasing integration of equity markets and capital markets in general can be expected to have 
three broad sets of implications if the integration spurs greater development of the financial sector 
(see Pagano, 1993). First, the attractiveness of international portfolio diversification will weaken as 
returns are equalized across countries.  Second, the more complete are the world’s capital market, 
the more robust will be the economies of individual states.  Third, household savings rates will 
consequently change over time. The former two outcomes are in general seen to have positive 
effects on economic growth while the latter is more uncertain.   
International portfolio diversification is justified only if there are gains from it. With increasing 
integration of international equity markets, the diversification benefits will tend to decline as the 
correlations become increasingly positive and strengthen. This concept has been well known for at 
least several centuries, and has been quantified and modeled since at least the early years of the 20
th 
century. Goetzmann et al. (2002) demonstrate, using over 150 years of capital market history that a 
few key facts keep emerging. First, the periods when diversification benefits tend to be of the 
highest potential (with low correlations between international indices) tend also to be periods that 
present investors with the greatest difficulty in diversifying. These tend to be periods of war and 3 
significant international tension. Second, the periods that have the highest correlations (and thus the 
lowest diversification benefits) are during the turn of the 19
th century, during the Great Depression, 
and during the late 20
th century, - which tend to be periods when markets are generally bearish in 
tendency. Thus, the third finding that diversification benefits are non-constant and may be least 
available when they are most needed.  Interestingly, it is not clear why these shifts in correlations 
and linkages occur over the long run.  Roll (1992) proposes Ricardian specialization, Heston and 
Rouwenhorst (1994) suggest that national cultures and economic predilections dominate industrial 
explanations, while Chen and Knez (1995) and Korajczyk (1996) suggest that lack of integration 
drives the issue, without addressing why this integration has not occurred.  
The structure of the paper is the following. The next section presents literature review on the 
linkages displayed by Russian stock market. Section 3 provides a brief overview of the 
development of the Russian stock markets since its re-establishment in 1991, including the events 
of the Russian crisis of August 1998 and its implications for the Russian stock market. Section 4 
presents data and methodology used in the study. Section 5 discusses empirical results and Section 
6 provides conclusions.  
 
2.  Russian equity market integration 
Studies that shed light on comovements of Russian and international stock prices are not 
plentiful and usually they analyze Russia along with other CEE markets. The conclusions of these 
studies do not necessarily conform to each other, due to differences in sample period, data 
frequency, stock market indices used and adjustment procedures applied to the indices used. 
Probably one of the earliest studies is that of Linne (1998). This study sought to investigate whether 
newly established Eastern European markets (Russia, Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic and 
Slovak Republic) display any long-relationships within the group, and with mature markets 
(Germany, UK, France, Italy, Switzerland, US and Japan). The data set consisted of local stock 
market indices expressed in US dollars, at weekly frequency, over the period from 1991 to 1997. 4 
The results suggest that during the sample period none of the two most important Russian stock 
market indices displayed linkages with any of the analyzed markets. Among the CEE markets only 
Poland displayed comovements with the world portfolio proxied by the MSCI-World index. By 
contrast, the Slovakian stock market showed cointegration relations with all mature stock markets. 
The author concludes that at that period CEE markets were mostly driven by the domestic factors. 
The paper, however, does not attempt to provide explanations of the country-specific patterns of the 
long-run linkages. 
Röckinger and Urga (2001) explored integration of the four emerging stock markets over the 
period from 1994 to 1997 using an extended Bekaert and Harvey (1997) model for conditional 
volatility with time varying parameters. Apart from valuable information about the extent and 
strength of financial integration provided by the time varying parameters, the advantages of this 
approach are the following. Firstly, accounting for GARCH structure of the residuals, it allows to 
establish the nature of the GARCH effect in case of the emerging markets (leverage vs. liquidity 
hypotheses). Secondly, the model incorporates a latent factor, which accounts for information 
beyond stock market indices. The study uses daily data for the most important local stock market 
indices expressed in US dollars. The results suggest that Russian stock market differs from the other 
three markets with regard to sources of shocks spillovers. United States and Germany are important 
sources of shock spillovers in case of Russia. Czech and Polish stock returns seem to reflect 
movements in the UK and not in the US. Both Czech and Hungarian stock returns were mostly 
influenced by German market movements, although in case of Hungary the impact has declined, 
whereas for Czech Republic it increased. The paper, however, does not comment on the importance 
of regional shocks for the CEE countries. 
Jochum, Kirschgässner and Platek (1998) (JKP) pointed out the importance of political and 
economic events in Russia for CEE economies (Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic). As an 
example, although by the end of 1997 CEE markets had largely recovered from the losses incurred 
due to Asian crisis, they underwent further losses as domestic Russian economic conditions 5 
worsened over the first half of 1998. Therefore in their analysis the authors take into account the 
timing of events in Russia when analyzing the impact of the crisis on the extent of predictability and 
co-movements between CEE markets and between these markets and the US stock market. 
Assuming a time-varying pattern of market comovements, JKP distinguish between pre-crisis and 
crisis periods. Basing on the results of the principal component analysis and Hansen and Johansen 
(1993) tests of the constancy of cointegration vector, they set the latter from 1 September 1997 to 
21 September 1998. They find considerable differences both in short-term and long-term linkages 
between the markets. In line with the evidence for developed markets (Longin and Solnik, 1995) 
they find significant increase in the values of daily correlations during the crisis period between 
market returns and absence of cointegration vectors for any of the markets. Before the crisis period 
the Russian stock market shared bivariate cointegration relations with Hungarian and the US 
markets, which are no longer detected in the crisis period. JKP explain the absence of cointegration 
after the crisis by the dominance of the short-run adjustments over the long-run dynamics. Results 
of the variance decomposition show that before the crisis 95 % per cent of the variance in the 
Russian stock market was explained by itself after 5 days. During the crisis period the share of 
foreign markets in explaining variance increased from 5% to 20 %. In both periods most of the 
impact was due to movements in US markets, with the Polish stock market exerting the smallest 
impact on fluctuations in the Russian stock market. 
Gelos and Sahay (2000b) explore financial spillovers due to various external crises on CEE 
foreign exchange and stock markets. They find increasing financial market integration since 1993, 
measured by the change in (unadjusted) stock return correlations. The increase is especially 
significant around the Russian crisis, what corresponds to the JKP finding. Gelos and Sahay find 
strong evidence of shock transmission from Russian to CEE markets, especially to the Hungarian 
one (compare with JKP (1998) finding above). Russian stock returns appear to Granger-cause 
returns in these markets, which did not seem to be the case before the crisis. They also document 
evidence that negative shocks in Russia have stronger effect on other emerging markets than 6 
positive ones. A similar study by Baele, Crombez and Schoors (2003), who note that EU equity 
shocks have increased influence on CEE after 1998, but that the Russian market remains segmented 
from EU influences. 
Jithendranathan and Kravchenko (2004) conclude, albeit using a simple regression analysis at 
the stock level that Russian equities are more integrated in the aftermath of the 1998 crisis.  Finally, 
Hayo and Kutan (2004) analyzed the impact of US stock returns on Russian stock and bond markets 
(along with other factors such as oil prices and political news), within a GARCH framework. The 
study covers the period between 1995 and 2001. The papers findings echo that of Röckinger and 
Urga (2001) suggesting US stock returns tend to Granger-cause Russian stock returns. Also, higher 
US returns seem to be associated with lower volatility on the Russian stock market. The paper also 
points to the link between increased financial liberalization and increased impact of the US returns. 
Therefore Hayo and Kutan (2004) study implies time varying pattern of the US-Russia relation; 
however, as opposed to Röckinger and Urga (2001), they utilize a static GARCH model. Finally, 
Fedorov and Sarkissian (2000) examine the issue of integration at the industry level, finding the not 
surprising result that integration with the world market proxy is greater the larger and more 
internationally orientated (through trade) is the typical industry firm.  
 
3.  The Russian stock markets 
Since published literature on emerging European stock markets usually analyses Russia along 
with a number of CEE countries, it does not provide much information the organization and 
development of the Russian stock market. This section aims to fill this gap, focusing in more detail 
on Russian stock market. Table 1 presents the basic statistics for the CEE markets; recent 
developments of Polish, Czech and Hungarian markets are analyzed in detail in Schroder (2001).  
TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
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3.1. Organization of the Russian stock market 
There are a number of stock exchanges in Russia. In terms of value most of stock trading takes 
place through MICEX (Moscow Interbank Currency Exchange) or through RTS (Russian Trading 
System). RTS, where trading is in US dollars is dominated by international investors, while Russian 
traders are concentrated in MICEX (Grigoriev and Valitova, 2002). Moscow Stock Exchange was 
traditionally a market for shares of Gazprom – the Russian gas monopoly. There are also a number 
of regional stock exchanges, however their share in stock trading is negligible in comparison with 
those of MICEX and RTS (see Appendix A for details). 
RTS Stock Exchange (Russian Trading System) 
RTS Stock Exchange, formerly RTS, was established in the middle of 1995 by leading 
brokerage companies to organize single regional markets. It is the first and the biggest electronic 
trading floor in Russia, organized using trading technologies provided by NASDAQ. Initially RTS 
operated as an OTC market, with settlement in foreign currency only. Nowadays RTS includes the 
following markets: RTS Classic Market (quote-driven) and RTS Order-driven stock market; 
FORTS (futures and options trading with ruble settlement); RTS Bonds (bonds trading); RTS Board 
(the system used for indicative quotation of securities not listed on the RTS); NQS Bills (the system 
used for indicative quotation of bills issued by Russian companies) (www.rts.ru). Classic market 
remains the main venue for trading by foreign and domestic investors. Order-driven stock market, 
established in 2002 in cooperation with Sankt-Peterburg Stock Exchange, aims to develop the ruble 
stock market segment of RTS. This is an important venue for trading of shares of Gazprom 
(Russian gas monopoly) and shares of other 200 companies (RTS, 2002). 
The official index of the RTS was first calculated on 1 September 1995. It is a market value-
weighted index of capitalization of shares on the RTS quoting lists. RTS index is calculated basing 
on the data from the RTS Classic Market. Since March 1999 RTS index is calculated not only in US 
Dollars, but also in Russian rubles. 8 
A key feature of the RTS is that trading is concentrated in a small number of companies 
representing oil and energy sectors. E.g., in 2002 shares of six companies (RAO UES (United 
Energy Systems), LUKoil, Surgutneftegaz, Yukos and Tatneft) accounted for 72 % of RTS 
turnover. I.e., in the short term, dynamics of the RTS index is determined by the market leaders. 
Companies from energy, oil and telecommunication industries account for more than 60 % of RTS 
capitalization.  
RTS is a dynamically developing exchange. By 1999 RTS accounted for about half of the 
trading volume of the Russian stock market, competing with MICEX. The exchange seeks to 
expand the range of stocks and other instruments and improve clearing and settlement procedures. 
In 2002 RTS introduced a market for futures and options, FORTS, although the Austrian 
Derivatives Exchange had introduced futures and options on RTS as early as 1997. Key indicators 
of RTS development are presented Table 2 and discussed in the following sub-sections in the 
context of events of crisis and post-crisis period. 
TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
MICEX (Moscow Interbank Currency Exchange) 
MICEX started security trading in March 1997 (FCS, 1997). It is another leading Russian 
trading floor, where trades are held in stocks of 150 Russian companies, including blue chips RAO 
UES, LUKoil, Rostelekom and Mosenergo. Total market capitalization is 150 bn USD. 2001 saw a 
drastic increase in MICEX turnover, as opposed to RTS that saw a decline in its trading in that year. 
In 2002 volume of transactions in MICEX reached 70 bn US Dollars (www.micex.ru).  
MICEX calculates the MICEX Composite Index (market value-weighted index of shares 
included in MICEX quotation lists) and MICEX10 (arithmetical average of price changes for 10 
most liquid stocks), available since 22 September 1997 and 6 January 1998.
1 
 
                                                 
1 See Grigoriev and Valitova (2002) for the analysis of the relationship between RTS and MICEX 
indices as well as impact of oil and gas prices on their dynamics. 9 
3.2. Development of the Russian stock market 
Crises of 1997-1998 and the Russian Stock Market 
The crisis in Russian financial markets of 1997-1998 is usually divided into the three periods: 
October 1997 – January 1998, March – May 1998 and July – August 1998 (IET, 1999; FCS, 1999). 
During the period to October 1997 RTS was characterized by an increase in trading volume and 
number of the participants, and the RTS Index displayed an impressive 94 % growth. However, 
positive tendencies in the stock market were taking place against the background of poor 
fundamentals of Russian economy (budget crisis, vulnerability of the banking system and high 
value of short-term government liabilities relatively to the values of the reserves of the Central 
Bank (IET, 1999), aggravated by instability in international financial markets, in particular, by the 
events in the South Asian markets in 1997. The latter are seen as those that stipulated the timing of 
the Russian crisis. As Buchs (1999) elegantly puts it: “…if the timing as well as the speed of the 
Russian crisis were definitely linked to the East Asian … events, the underlying vulnerability of  
Russia was a serious problem which no investor could ignore”.
2 Under these circumstances, foreign 
investors that started close monitoring of the economy fundamentals initiated selling government 
and corporate bonds. Increased demand for foreign currency triggered a sharp decline of the 
reserves of the Central Bank.
3 These events were reflected in the falling stock market: by January 
1998 RTS Index plummeted by 50%. 
In March – May 1998 there followed a further 20 % decline in stock market prices. The 
government crisis, a worsening deficit of the balance of payments and issue of new debt induced 
                                                 
2 The Asian crisis of the late summer of 1997 saw the meltdown of East Asian currencies that led to 
further speculative attacks on East Asian financial system components including equity markets, 
and further spread to the Latin American exchanges. We thus have in our sample two interlinked 
crises closely following each other that may emerge as potential sources of instability in the 
relationships. 
3 Buchs (1999) points out, that financial linkages between emerging markets in form of substantial 
amounts of Russian and Brazilian government debt by Korean banks and Russian short-term bonds 
(GKO) by Brazilian banks, served as a contagion channel in the course of Asian crisis. Komulainen 
(1999) indicate another reason behind the spillover effect, namely decline in prices for the row 
materials stipulated by the decreased demand in Asia. 10 
foreign investors continue selling Russian securities. Despite financial aid provided by IMF and 
IBRD in July, further decline in prices of the Russian securities took place. The crisis of the Russian 
banking system provided an additional reason. Russian banks, facing increased claims from the 
foreign lenders, were induced to sell securities to maintain their currency reserves.
4 As a result, a 
new wave of price declines took place. On 17 August 1998 the Russian central bank allowed the 
ruble to devaluate. During August – September 1998 the RTS Index fell by almost 70 %.  
 Post-Crisis Development 
By 1999 international interest in the Russian stock market was very low, reflected in record-low 
levels of trading activity, which had fallen by 84 % since 1997. Low turnover created pre-
conditions for the speculative growth of the market that amounted to 194 % and made RTS the 
fastest growing market in the world. In the next year, despite the fastest growth of Russian economy 
since the start of the reforms, the performance of the stock market was disappointing: RTS declined 
by 20 %. This reflected primarily a decline in price of the Russian blue chips, mostly oil companies 
depending heavily on the dynamics of the oil prices. However, improving macroeconomic and 
political situation helped to revive the interest of investors and boost turnover, which more than 
doubled in 2000 (IET, 2001). During 2001-2003 the Russian market grew, in contrast to the 
slowdown in the US and EU economies and financial and political instability in Latin American 
emerging markets. In 2002 RTS grew by one third. In 2003 the political risks of investing in 
Russian market became important again against the background of the conflict between Yukos and 
government that resulted in imprisonment of the head of the company M. Khodorkovsky. The 
market reacted with a 25 % decline during October 2003.
5 However, the overall results of the year 
were positive due to remarkable increase in prices of the blue chips, stipulated by high oil prices. 
                                                 
4 See Ippolito (2002) for the excellent review of the state of the Russian banking system during and 
after the crisis. 
5 See The Economist (2004) about the reaction of the Russian stock market on the development of 
the Yukos case. RTS plummeted despite soaring oil prices after the rumors about the Yukos 
bankruptcy strengthened.  11 
Growth of some of the leading companies exceeded 100 % (Norilskij Nikel – 220 %; Mosenergo – 
114 %; RAO UES – 112 %).  
4.  Data and methodology 
4.1. Data  
Several equity market indices currently exist for Russia. The most widely recognised ones are 
the RTS Index, the NAUFOR official index, and the MT Index calculated by the Moscow Times 
newspaper. Other indices include the AK&M information agency and Commersant newspaper 
indices, with Creditanshtalt-Grant, Russian Brokerage House and CS First Boston all also 
producing variants of indices. In this paper we use MSCI indices, dollar denominated, on a daily 
frequency. The indices analyzed are those for Russia, EMU Countries, UK, USA, Japan, Hungary, 
Czech Republic and Poland. The choice of data reflects a desire to analyze co-movements of the 
Russian market both with the developed markets and local markets. The data run from December 
31, 1994 to October 14, 2004. We use MSCI indices as they are designed to be directly comparable 
across national exchanges, compiled on a value-weighted basis of freely investible shares. As such 
they represent here a dataset that is significantly different to the most of the previous studies and are 
we believe more directly comparable than those used by other studies. Shown in Table 3 are the 
basic descriptive statistics of the returns of the indices, and in Table 4 the correlation matrix of the 
returns data. All data in the sample are found to be I(1) in levels of the indices and I(0) in returns 
using conventional unit root testing procedures of Dickey-Fuller and Phillips-Perron. 
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4.2. Methodology  
Johansen Cointegration Tests and VECM Modeling 
We are concerned to capture in any modeling both the short run and the long run relationships 
that may arise. We initially examine the data for cointegration under the Johansen approach. Where 
we find cointegrating vectors, the parameters of these vectors are then set as constraints in a Vector 
Error Cointegration Model. This allows us to derive, while addressing long-run equilibrium 12 
relations, the short-run dynamics of the system using impulse response functions (IRF’s) and 
Variance Decomposition Analysis (VDA). We analyze the data in the entire period (December 31, 
1994 - October 14, 2004), and in three sub-periods: before 1997, during the 1997-1998 crises 
period, and from 1999 onward. Thus we first separate crisis and tranquil periods by exogenously 
defining the duration of these periods, relaying on the market events described in Section 3.2. Since 
imposing the break dates exogenously may not necessarily reflect the true dynamics of the 
adjustment process, we proceed with the methodology that allows to estimate the break dates from 
the data, Gregory-Hansen Residual Based cointegration test. 
Gregory - Hansen (1996) Residual Based Cointegration Test 
Results of Monte Carlo experiments (Campos, Ericcson, and Hendry, 1996; Gregory and 
Hansen, 1996) show that when a shift in parameters takes place standard tests for cointegration (like 
the one of Engle-Granger, 1987) may lose power and falsely signal the absence of equilibrium in 
the system. A number of tests of unit roots under structural stability are available. In this paper we 
use the Gregory-Hansen (1996) test. The Gregory-Hansen test assumes the null hypothesis of no 
cointegration against the alternative hypothesis of cointegration with a single structural break of 
unknown timing. The timing of the structural change under the alternative hypothesis is estimated 
endogenously. Gregory and Hansen suggest three alternative models accommodating changes in 
parameters of the cointegration vector under the alternative. A level shift model allows for the 
change in the intercept only (C): 
, ' 2 2 1 1 t t t t e y y + + + = α ϕ µ µ τ   n t ,......, 1 = .  (1)
The second model accommodating a trend in data also restricts shift only to the change in level with 
a trend (C/T): 
, ' 2 2 1 1 t t t t e y t y + + + + = α β ϕ µ µ τ   n t ,......, 1 = .  (2)
The most general specification allows for changes both in the intercept and slope of the 
cointegration vector (R/S): 13 
, ' ' 2 2 1 1 2 1 1 t t t t t t e y y y + + + + = τ τ ϕ α α ϕ µ µ   n t ,......, 1 = .  (3)

















where ) 1 , 0 ( ∈ τ  is a relative timing of the change point.  The trimming interval is usually taken to 
be (0.15n,  0.08n), as recommended in Andrews (1993). The models (1)-(3) are estimated 
sequentially with the break point changing over the interval ) 85 . 0 , 15 . 0 ( n n ∈ τ . Non-stationarity of 
the obtained residuals, expected under the null hypothesis, is checked by ADF and PP tests. Setting 
the test statistics (denoted as ADF* (Za*, Zt*)) to the smallest value of the ADF (Za, Zt) statistics in 
the sequence, we select the value that constitutes the strongest evidence against the null hypothesis 
of no cointegration.  
DCC-GARCH Approach  
We also use the recent Dynamic Conditional Correlation specification of Multivariate GARCH 
models (Engle, 2002) to model the main series for which we find significant relationships. Unlike 
the previous methodologies we analyze the multivariate relationships using returns of the indices. 
Arising from the Gregory-Hansen and the Johansen-Juselius approach we identify the variables that 
are related in longterm equilibrium and then model these using the multivariate GARCH model. We 
use a parsimonious approach, describing the mean and variances as both ARMA(1,1) processes. 
This is strictly ad-hoc. The data are modeled as a DCC-GARCH(1,1) process, within a four variable 
system. The major advantage of this formulation is that while it preserves the main features of 
standard multivariate GARCH models it allows for explicit time variation in the conditional 
covariance (and correlation) matrix. The extraction of the conditional time varying correlations 
allows us to examine the short-run dynamics of the series that are linked by a long-run relationship. 
It also allows to trace the effects attributed to the sequence of crisis events that took place 
throughout the sample. 14 
 
5. Results 
We examine the data over the entire period and over three sub periods as shown above. We use 
two techniques, as discussed, the Johansen multivariate method and the Gregory-Hansen approach. 
We show the results for the Johansen approach in Table 5 and the Gregory-Hansen approach in 
Table 6, Table 7, and Table 8. We show in Table 9 the variance decomposition for the four periods. 
Two distinctly different stories emerge from these methods. 
5.1. Johansen multivariate cointegration test, VARs and IRFs results 
A number of features arise from a Johansen analysis over the entire period (Table 5). Johansen 
cointegration tests based on a lag length of 2
6 indicates absence of cointegrating vectors. This, if 
correct, would have important finance implications. The first is that there is no long run stable 
relationship between the various equity markets. As a consequence, there are potential gains from 
international diversification, the series all moving separately with no shared common stochastic 
trend.  
TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE 
This evidence is relatively unusual. Although earlier studies on cointegration that used bivariate 
Engle-Granger approach have found little evidence in favour of cointegration, the later papers that 
used the more sophisticated Johansen multivariate approach generally find stronger evidence of 
integration. To the former group belong works of Kasa (1992) that finds a single cointegrating 
vector indicating low levels of integration, Arshanapalli and Doukas (1993) that document similar 
results for world market. Gallagher (1995) finds no evidence of cointegration between Irish and 
either German or UK equity markets. Studies that, like the present analysis, have used Johansen 
multivariate approach, find stronger evidence of integration. Some evidence of integration is found 
in Chou, Ng et al. (1994) for the G7 countries, Hung and Cheung (1995) for the Asian markets, 
Kearney (1998) for Irish and European markets, Gilmore and McManus (2002) for US – Central 
                                                 
6 In all cases and sub-periods we found that a lag of 2 was appropriate for VAR analyses, based on 
the Hannan-Quinn and Schwartz criteria. Except for Poland in the precrisis period we find, using 
ADF tests, that the data are I(1). 15 
European markets, and Ratanapakorn and Sharma (2002) and Manning (2002) for Southeast Asian, 
European and US markets. This is not unanimous however, with Kanas (1988), Chan, Gup et al. 
(1992) and Allen and Macdonald (1995) finding evidence of segmentation.  
Having found no long-term relationship, we proceed to a Vector Autoregression without the 
need to impose error correction terms. We order the data based on the contemporaneous correlation 
between the equity indices, giving the ordering shown. Based on Block Exclusion tests we find that 
all variables apart from EMU and Czech Republic (CZ) have an impact on Russia. An examination 
of the residual correlation matrix indicates that there is strong remaining correlation between the 
variables, and thus while Impulse Response Functions (IRF) can be derived we cannot, except in 
the case of Russia-Japan, ascribe the resulting shocks to the perturbed series. For the Japan (JP) case 
we find that a positive shock in Japan leads to a rapid and sustained drop in the Russian market 
return of .4%.  
FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE 
Examining the pre-crisis period, December 1994 – December 1996, we again find no long-run 
relationship present in the data, again indicating that over that period there would have been 
diversification benefits from investing in the area (see Table 5). There is a different order implied in 
the VAR model than that for the overall period. In common with the findings for the entire period, 
we find, based on block exogeneity tests, that all series apart from EMU and CZ have an impact on 
Russia.  
  Apart from Poland the residuals are uncorrelated with the Russian market, and so we can 
examine IRF’s. The evidence from the IRF’s is mixed with regard to the markets. Local CEE 
markets provide little stimulus to the Russian market, while it responds strongly positively to rises 
in US and EMU markets and falls against UK and Japanese markets. 
FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE 
During the period around the Russian and Asian crises, defined as 1997-1998 here, we find 
emerging some evidence of long-run relationships (see Table 5). During the crisis period we find a 16 
single cointegrating vector, between Russia and Japan, emerging. This provides some evidence of 
weak international integration. However, after the crisis period, while there is increased evidence of 
integration, with two cointegrating vectors, Russia is not bivariatly correlated with any of the other 
variables.  Again we find that all variables, apart from the Czech and EMU, have a significant 
impact on Russia. The strong correlations evident between the majority of the variables, apart from 
RU-JP and RU-CZ, renders interpretation of the IRF’s uncertain. Again, the response to the 
Japanese market is negative, consistently overall, while the response to the EMU is mixed, starting 
negative and then rising to end positive. The evidence is that, consistently, the Russian market 
responds negatively to shocks in the Japanese and positively to shocks from the USA with mixed 
responses to UK and EMU markets and negligible responses to local markets (Poland, Czech and 
Hungary). 
FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE 
Therefore the evidence from Johansen cointegration tests suggests that the Russian equity 
market remains segmented from the world equity markets. With the exception of the crisis period 
there was and remains a benefit to international diversification by including holdings of Russian 
equities for the investors of the other countries examined. Even within a VAR system we find that 
the market has remained relatively isolated. In particular, Russian equities remain segmented from 
the EMU markets.  
  5.2. Gregory-Hansen test results 
Turning however to the Gregory-Hansen approach, we find a different situation as regards long-
run relationships. For the Russian market the test indicates the presence of a number of bivariate 
cointegration relations with major markets. In particular, we find that the Russian market was 
cointegrated with the EMU, UK and USA, albeit with a break in the relationship.  In the 
multivariate setting break is found in the cointegration vector for Russia and two groups of the 
developed markets (including and excluding Japan). Overall we find a number of unique 
breakpoints. These are all in the period June-August 1998, corresponding exactly to the etiology of 17 
the crisis. The breaks detected were 01/06/98, 02/06/98, 08/06/98, 06/07/98, 09/07/98, 11/08/98. 
The final break point was therefore set at 31/7/98, to allow for the gradual adjustment. These results 
lead us to suggest that despite the serious impact on world markets of the Asian crisis of 1997 we 
find no evidence here that this crisis had an immediate effect on the stability of relationships 
between Russia and developed or regional markets.  
Using 31/7/98 as the breakpoint in Table 7 and Table 8 we show the results of further Gregory-
Hansen analyses. In the ‘pre-crisis’ period, up to 31/7/98, we find no evidence of bivariate 
cointegration relations between the Russian market and any other market or group of markets 
(Table 7). This corresponds to the results of Johansen cointegration tests showing that the Russian 
stock market remained isolated until 1997. In the ‘post-crisis’ period, defined relaying on Gregory-
Hansen test results as 01/08/98 - 14/10/04, we find evidence of bivariate cointegration relations for 
all four developed markets, again however with a break (Table 8). This break holds both 
individually and as a group. In the multivariate setting break is found in the cointegration vector for 
Russia and two groups of the developed markets (including and excluding Japan). We also find, for 
the first time, some evidence of increased integration with regional economies, the Gregory-Hansen 
techniques showing evidence in favour of cointegration with Poland, and very weak evidence for 
cointegration with Hungary. Therefore Gregory-Hansen test results strengthen weak evidence in 
favor of increased integration of the Russian stock market provided by the Johansen tests. The test 
suggest that the long-run market co-movements has strengthened after the major crisis events in the 
Russian economy have taken place; the test thus indicates the importance of the Russian crisis for 
the dynamics of the long-run relationships between the Russian and developed stock markets.   
5.3. DCC-GARCH results 
Whether the pattern of the short-run interdependencies between the Russian and major 
developed markets has been affected in a similar manner is examined by means of the DCC-
GARCH model. The correlations are derived from a quadrivariate ARMA(1,1)-DCC-GARCH(1,1)  18 
model estimated over the 1995-2001 period. Shown in Figure 6 are the estimated daily conditional 
correlations between Russia and the main developed markets.  
FIGURE 6 ABOUT HERE 
The marked change in the pattern of conditional correlations in summer of 1997, at the time of 
the Asian crisis, is evident. As emerges from Figure 6, during the period of Asian crisis the 
correlations with the major equity indices raised dramatically by mid 1997, especially with EMU 
markets. In the second half of 1997, as the crisis was unfolding, the strength of the short-term 
dependencies weakened reflected in falling conditional correlations, especially in the cases of the 
UK and EMU; correlations with the USA remained relatively stable. Interestingly, correlation level 
with the USA has remained the lowest of the three correlation series. Second rise in conditional 
correlations with EMU and UK followed in the first half of 1998, coinciding with the first phase of 
the Russian crisis. This rise in the extent of short-term relationship preceded the break in the long-
term relationships in August 1998 point indicated by the Gregory-Hansen test. Towards the end of 
1999, as the crisis was evolving, we again observe a sharp decline in the intensity of the co-
movements as the events in the domestic market started to dominate influences from abroad. Simple 
visual inspection of the Figure 6 suggests presence of the three periods with differing patterns of the 
conditional correlations: before 1997 (upward trend, low volatility), 1997-1998 (with two major 
peaks in the series), and since 1999 (no distinct trend, high volatility; higher levels than before 
1997). The evidence from conditional correlations provides an indirect support to our exogenous 
division of the sample in the three sub-periods used in Section 4.1. The DCC analysis suggests, not 
surprisingly, that short-term interdependencies between the Russian and the developed stock 
markets underwent major changes in the 1997-98 period and have been generally strengthening 
afterwards. 
  5.4. Variance Decomposition results  
Shown in Table 9 are variance decompositions, showing the percentage of forecast errors, over 
a 10-day period, that are attributable to each series. The table reports results using exogenous break 19 
point to separate crisis period. However, the results using the break points suggested by Gregory-
Hansen approach lead to the same conclusions. 
TABLE 9 ABOUT HERE 
An interesting feature that emerges from Table 9 is the changing role of the EMU markets as a 
source of volatility of the Russian stock market. Whereas movements in the European markets 
played an important role for the Russian stock market during the crisis, their importance dropped 
significantly afterwards, therefore leaving the USA a dominant source of influence on the Russian 
market, albeit the dominance of the latter has also fallen post crisis. During the crisis another 
dominant market appeared to be the Japanese one. Post-crisis, we find that shocks in EMU or local 
markets play little role in determining changes in the Russian market. 
 
6. Conclusion 
We have examined the relationship between Russian, developed markets, and other Central and 
Eastern European equity markets over the 1995-2004 period. During this period the Russian crisis 
of 1997-1998 had major impacts on equity markets worldwide. Using traditional Johansen 
multivariate cointegration approaches and examining Impulse Response Functions from Vector-
Error Correction Models we find that the extent of the relationship differs markedly before and after 
the Russian crisis of 1998. However, further examination, using the Gregory-Hansen approach, 
indicates that the effect of the Russian crisis is more complex, and that Russian market shows 
significantly more evidence of integration with developed markets since, albeit the extent of 
interdependencies differs in case of the US and European markets. The USA remains the dominant 
market from which shocks impact on the Russian market A DCC-GARCH model indicates that the 
conditional relationships between the Russian market and the main developed markets is, as shown 
by the Gregory-Hansen approach, shifting. No clear effect of the Asian crisis is evident from our 
analysis, with the DCC measures showing it to have had a major effect, the Gregory-Hansen tests, 
not.  20 
 
Acknowledgements 
Research assistance of Thomas Lagoarde Segot and Terhi Jokipii is gratefully acknowledged. We 
wish also to thank the participants in the IIIS Workshop in International Financial Integration, in 
particular Patrick Geary, Thomas Flavin and Margaret Hurley. 
 
Appendix A. Russian Stock Exchanges 
 
RTS Stock Exchange (www.rts.ru) 
 
Moscow Interbank Curency Exchange (www.micex.ru) 
 
Moscow Stock Exchange (www.mse.ru) 
 
Sankt-Petersburg Stock Exchange (www.spbex.ru) 
 
Rostov Currency and Stock Exchange (www.rndex.ru) 
 
Nizhny Novgorod Stock and Currency Exchange (www.nnx.ru) 
 
Kazan Board of Security Trade (www.kbst.ru) 
 
Ekaterinburg Stock Exchange (www.ese.ru) 
 
Siberian Interbank Currency Exchange (www.sice.ru) 
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Figure 1: MSCI Indices, Russia, CEE and Developed Markets 
MSCI Indices Russia, CEE and Developed Markets
Base 31/12/94=100
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Figure 6: Conditional Correlation Coefficients from ARMA (1, 1) -DCC-GARCH (1, 1) Model 
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Table 1: CEE Stock Markets as of December 2003 
INDICATOR RUSSIA*  POLAND  HUNGARY  CZECH 
REPUBLIC 
Market capitalization, mn USD  72,210  28,849  12,988  25,122 
Value of Share Trading, 2003, mn USD     9,662  8,269  9,187 
Number of listed securities  207  203  49  65 








Local index, % change 2002–2003  57 %  44.9%  20.3%  43% 
Market capitalization as % of the GDP  22 %  14%  17%   
Source: World Federation of Stock Exchanges (http://www.world-exchanges.org), Prague Stock Exchange 
(www.pse.cz) 
 
Table 2: Key Indicators for RTS Stock Exchange 
  1995* 1996  1997  1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Market capitalization, bn USD  .  . .  .  32.4  35  69.2  92.9  72.2 
Value of Stock Trading, bn 
USD  
0.22 3.54 15.6 9.3 2.4 5.8 4.9 4.6 6.1 
Average Daily Turnover, mn 
USD 
. .  62.7  36.9  9.5  23.3  19  18  24 
Number of listed securities  .  .  324  369  358  391  368  247  312 
Stock Exchange Index: RTS  82.92  200.50  396.41  58.9  175.3  143.3  256.8  359.1  567.3 
RTS, % change to previous 
year 
-17% 129%  98% -86%  194%  -20% 96% 34% 57  % 
Source: RTS Annual Reports, various issues 
 
Table 3: Basic Descriptive Statistics (% returns data), 1994–2004 
 EMU  UK  USA  Russia  Poland  Hungary  Japan  Czech 
N  2555 2555 2555 2555 2555 2555 2555 2555
Minimum  -5.84% -5.27% -6.97%  -28.10%  -11.59%  -19.01% -7.16% -7.39%
Maximum  5.72% 5.26% 5.61%  24.22% 9.02%  13.00%  12.27% 6.76%
Mean  0.03% 0.02% 0.03% 0.07% 0.02% 0.06%  -0.02% 0.03%
Std. 
Deviation 
1.23% 1.09% 1.14% 3.42% 1.96% 1.96% 1.48% 1.52%
Skewness  - 0.1775   - 0.1810   - 0.1200   - 0.3309   - 0.1105   - 0.5793   0.2593   - 0.1349  
Kurtosis  2.2533   2.2708   3.2349   8.0672   2.5049   9.9245   3.2632   2.0393  
   32
Table 4: Correlation Matrix (% returns data), 1994–2004 
   UK  USA  Russia  Poland  Hungary  Japan  Czech 
EMU   0.7665    0.4259   0.3097    0.3397     0.3984    0.2152   0.3743 
UK     0.3722   0.2576    0.2730     0.3090    0.1749   0.2927 
USA      0.1574    0.1278     0.1387    0.0664   0.1168 
Russia        0.2730     0.3326    0.1336   0.2585 
Poland             0.4081    0.2216   0.3329 
Hungary          0.2047    0.3569 
Japan           0.1764 
 
Table 5: Johansen Cointegration Tests 
    Trace =0    Trace=1    Trace=2    Max=0    Max=1    Max=2  
 Overall    105.3236   70.10955   44.59244   35.21407   25.51711   17.36702 
 Precrisis    151.1522   92.27682   63.73410   58.87537   28.54272   24.35854 
 Crisis    151.1522   92.27682   63.73410   58.87537***   28.54272   24.35854 
 Post Crisis    179.8941***   125.3571*   78.32393   54.53705***   47.03316**   26.91778 
Table shows the results of a Johansen-Juselius Multivariate cointegration test . Null hypothesis is that of a specificed or maxiumum 
number of cointegrating relationships (trace and max statistics respectively) ***, **, * - denotes significance at the 1, 5 and 10 % 
levels respectively 
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Table 6: Gregory-Hansen Cointegration Tests: Overall Period 
Variables Model  ADF  Break 
point/Date 
PP Zt  Break 
point/Date 
PP Za  Break 
point/Date 
Russia – EMU  C  -2.62  0.157  -2.39  0.155  -12.73  0.155 






Russia – EMU  C/S  -2.73  0.335 -2.63  0.334  -14.86  0.336 
Russia – UK  C  -2.79  0.157  -2.56  0.155  -14.44  0.155 






Russia – UK  C/S  -2.96  0.329 -2.90  0.329  -18.07  0.335 
Russia – USA   C  -2.65  0.157  -2.38  0.155  -12.54  0.155 






Russia – USA   C/S  -2.63  0.157 -2.52  0.234  -12.71  0.234 
Russia – Japan  C  -2.28  0.157 -2.17  0.849  -9.42  0.155 
Russia – Japan  C/T  -3.86  0.359 -3.74  0.360  -28.33  0.360 
Russia – Japan  C/S  -2.60  0.296 -2.41  0.294  -12.79  0.294 
Russia – EMU, 
UK, USA 
C -4.80  0.500  -5.15*  0.509  -52.63*  0.509 
Russia – EMU, 
UK, USA 






Russia – EMU, 
UK, USA 
C/S -5.29 0.515  -5.52  0.509  -60.29  0.509 
Russia – All 
Developed 
Markets 
C -5.34*  0.516  -5.49*  0.509  -59.66**  0.509 
Russia – All 
Developed 
Markets 






Russia – All 
Developed 
Markets 
C/S -5.27 0.524  -5.84  0.513  -67.37  0.513 
Russia – Poland  C  -3.35  0.652 -3.43  0.652  -22.46  0.652 
Russia – Poland  C/T  -4.20  0.360 -4.08  0.360  -33.63  0.360 
Russia – Poland  C/S  -3.60  0.649 -3.59  0.637  -25.71  0.636 
Russia – Hungary   C  -2.36  0.606 -2.29  0.293  -10.49  0.293 
Russia – Hungary   C/T  -4.47 0.359 -4.31  0.360  -37.23  0.360 
Russia – Hungary   C/S  -2.45 0.304 -2.36  0.299  -11.13  0.299 
Russia – Czech 
Republic 
C -3.09  0.157  -2.86  0.155  -16.42  0.155 
Russia – Czech 
Republic 
C/T -3.85 0.359  -3.69  0.360  -27.14  0.360 
Russia – Czech 
Republic 
C/S -3.07 0.157  -2.84  0.155  -16.22  0.155 
Russia – All CEE 
Markets 
C -3.16  0.659  -3.12  0.653  -19.65  0.65 
Russia – All CEE 
Markets 
C/T -5.31**  0.360  -5.21  0.349  -51.87  0.35 
Russia – All CEE 
Markets 
C/S -4.78 0.336  -4.79  0.337  -45.55  0.33 
Model specifications for the bivariate cointegration relationship: C – level shift (change in constant); C/T – level shift with 
trend (model with a linear trend and change in constant only); C/S – regime shift (model with change in both constant and 
slope). Critical values are taken from Gregory and Hansen (1996). ***, **, * - denotes significance at the 1, 5 and 10 % 
levels respectively.   34
Table 7: Gregory-Hansen Cointegration Tests: Pre-crisis Period 30/12/1994–31/07/1998 
Variables Model  ADF  Break 
point/Date 
PP Zt  Break 
point/Date 
PP Za  Break 
point/Date 
Russia – EMU  C  -2.59  0.429  -2.47  0.850  -14.19  0.850 
Russia – EMU  C/T  -3.37  0.207 -3.47  0.200 -24.38  0.200 
Russia – EMU  C/S  -4.10  0.774 .4.08  0.768 -28.06  0.768 
Russia – UK  C  -3.48  0.845  -3.53  0.850  -23.26  0.850 
Russia – UK  C/T  -3.27  0.850 -3.36  0.850 -20.92  0.850 
Russia – UK  C/S  -3.49  0.771 -3.52  0.769 -23.45  0.769 
Russia – USA   C  -2.86  0.847  -2.90  0.849  -14.69  0.849 
Russia – USA   C/T  -2.86  0.398 -2.85  0.398 -17.07  0.398 
Russia – USA   C/S  -3.55  0.670 -3.48  0.679 -20.69  0.679 
Russia – Japan  C  -2.87  0.429 -2.53  0.424 -14.16  0.421 
Russia – Japan  C/T  -2.81  0.848 -2.73  0.558 -16.79  0.558 
Russia – Japan  C/S  -3.15  0.667 -3.10  0.694 -19.75  0.694 
Russia – EMU, UK, USA  C  -3.71 0.842  -4.02 0.199  -28.24  0.186 
Russia – EMU, UK, USA  C/T  -4.29 0.369  -4.27 0.363  -33.99  0.363 
Russia – EMU, UK, USA  C/S  -4.63 0.768  -4.88 0.393  -44.30  0.393 
Russia – All Developed 
Markets 
C  -3.80 0.394  -4.01 0.199  -28.19  0.199 
Russia – All Developed 
Markets 
C/T  -4.42 0.569  -4.28 0.363  -34.70  0.568 
Russia – All Developed 
Markets 
C/S  -4.78 0.768  -5.04 0.393  -46.74  0.393 
Russia – Poland  C  -2.87  0.429 -2.56  0.424 -14.36  0.642 
Russia – Poland  C/T  -2.72  0.832 -2.55  0.850 -12.95  0.804 
Russia – Poland  C/S  -3.03  0.541 -2.76  0.540 -17.13  0.543 
Russia – Hungary   C  -3.18  0.845 -3.04  0.850 -21.38  0.839 
Russia – Hungary   C/T  -3.28 0.838  -3.12 0.839  -22.53  0.839 
Russia – Hungary   C/S  -3.28 0.786  -3.32 0.688  -24.12  0.688 
Russia – Czech Republic  C  -3.78 0.379  -3.27 0.382  -21.26  0.382 
Russia – Czech Republic  C/T  -2.72 0.848  -2.57 0.382  -14.26  0.382 
Russia – Czech Republic  C/S  -3.01 0.363  -3.01 0.395  -19.32  0.395 
Russia – All CEE 
Markets 
C  -3.33 0.817  -3.18 0.816  -23.87  0.816 
Russia – All CEE 
Markets 
C/T  -3.37 0.817  -3.21 0.816  -24.18  0.816 
Russia – All CEE 
Markets 
C/S  -4.44 0.837  -4.23 0.836  -35.97  0.836 
Model specifications for the bivariate cointegration relationship: C – level shift (change in constant); C/T – level shift 
with trend (model with a linear trend and change in constant only); C/S – regime shift (model with change in both 
constant and slope). Critical values are taken from Gregory and Hansen (1996). ***, **, * - denotes significance at the 1, 
5 and 10 % levels respectively   35
Table 8: Gregory-Hansen Cointegration Tests: Post-crisis Period 01/08/1998–14/10/2003 
Variables  Model  ADF  Break point/Date  PP Zt  Break point/Date  PP Za  Break point/Date 
Russia – EMU  C  -2.94  0.510  -2.86  0.507  -16.43  0.507 
Russia – EMU  C/T  -4.83**  0.848 (05/11/03) -4.99**  0.846  (31/10/03  -40.90  0.848 
Russia – EMU  C/S  -3.36  0.427 -3.42  0.426 -23.99  0.426 
Russia – UK  C  -2.91  0.843  -2.78  0.841  -15.18  0.841 
Russia – UK  C/T  -4.78**  0.847 (03/11/03) -4.92**  0.846  (31/10/03) -39.57  0.846 
Russia – UK  C/S  -2.84  0.246 -3.04  0.248 -18.78  0.248 
Russia – USA   C  -3.07  0.508  -2.98  0.529  -17.78  0.529 
Russia – USA   C/T  -5.80***  0.848 (05/11/03)  -5.85***  0.846 (31/10/03)  -48.72**  0.846 (31/10/03) 
Russia – USA   C/S  -3.80  0.424 -3.74  0.425 -26.19  0.425 
Russia – Japan  C  -3.63  0.502 -3.62  0.502 -24.99  0.502 
Russia – Japan  C/T  -5.88***  0.846 (31/10/03)  -5.94***  0.846 (31/10/03)  -50.73***  0.846 (31/10/03) 
Russia – Japan  C/S  -3.67  0.502 -3.67  0.483 -25.51  0.502 
Russia – EMU, UK, 
USA 
C  -5.09**  0.841 -6.09***  0.830 -69.23***  0.830 
Russia – EMU, UK, 
USA 
C/T  -7.32*** 0.574  -7.36*** 0.519  -53.14***  0.591 
Russia – EMU, UK, 
USA 
C/S  -7.29*** 0.604  (01/05/02) -8.04*** 0.602 (26/04/02  -110.63***  0.602 (26/04/02) 
Russia – All 
Developed Markets 
C  -5.35*  0.843 -6.26***  0.830 -72.44***  0.830 
Russia – All 
Developed Markets 
C/T  -7.61*** 0.549  -7.52*** 0.542  -84.11***  0.542 
Russia – All 
Developed Markets 
C/S  -7.25*** 0.604  (01/05/02  ) -8.01*** 0.602  (26/04/02) -109.75*** 0.602  (26/04/02) 
Russia – Poland  C  -3.42  0.457 -3.49  0.450 -24.19  0.450 
Russia – Poland  C/T  -4.85**  0.200 (28/10/99) -4.80*  0.217  (06/12/99  -41.80  0.217 
Russia – Poland  C/S  -3.66  0.446 -3.74  0.447 -27.54  0.447 
Russia – Hungary   C  -3.84  0.270 -3.76  0.266 -28.34  0.266 
Russia – Hungary   C/T  -4.58 0.218  -4.50 0.150  -36.98  0.217 
Russia – Hungary   C/S  -4.56  0.293  -4.64 0.291  -42.49*  0.291  (22/05/00) 
Russia – Czech 
Republic 
C  -1.44 0.248  -1.19 0.849  -3.70  0.245 
Russia – Czech 
Republic 
C/T -4.66 0.568  -4.41 0.568  -38.97  0.568 
Russia – Czech 
Republic 
C/S -1.57 0.827  -1.41 0.823  -4.19  0.823 
Russia – All CEE 
Markets 
C  -3.89 0.823  -3.82 0.823  -29.41  0.823 
Russia – All CEE 
Markets 
C/T -5.27 0.456  -5.13 0.462  -51.80  0.462 
Russia – All CEE 
Markets 
C/S -4.32 0.743  -4.34 0.575  -37.60  0.575 
Model specifications for the bivariate cointegration relationship: C – level shift (change in constant); C/T – level shift with trend (model 
with a linear trend and change in constant only); C/S – regime shift (model with change in both constant and slope). Critical values are 
taken from Gregory and Hansen (1996). ***, **, * - denotes significance at the 1, 5 and 10 % levels respectively 
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Table 9: Variance Decompositions: 10 day horizons, % Terms 
   Period   RU    CZ    HU    JP    PL    UK    US    EMU 
O v e r a l l              
  1   100.00   -   -   -   -   -   -    -  
  2   97.56    0.12    0.08    0.06    0.00    0.03    2.02   0.13  
  3   97.02    0.15    0.12    0.08    0.00    0.03    2.42   0.18  
  4   96.73    0.16    0.14    0.09    0.00    0.03    2.63   0.22  
  5   96.53    0.17    0.15    0.09    0.00    0.02    2.78   0.25  
  6   96.37    0.18    0.15    0.09    0.00    0.02    2.90   0.29  
  7   96.24    0.19    0.15    0.10    0.00    0.02    2.99   0.32  
  8   96.11    0.19    0.15    0.10    0.00    0.02    3.08   0.35  
  9   96.00    0.20    0.15    0.10    0.01    0.02    3.15   0.39  
  10   95.88    0.20    0.15    0.10    0.01    0.02    3.22   0.42  
Precrisis              
  1   100.00   -   -   -   -   -   -    -  
  2   99.94    0.00    0.00    0.01    0.00    0.03    0.00   0.01  
  3   99.80    0.01    0.00    0.04    0.01    0.09    0.02   0.04  
  4   99.59    0.01    0.00    0.07    0.02    0.19    0.03   0.09  
  5   99.33    0.02    0.00    0.11    0.02    0.31    0.06   0.14  
  6   99.03    0.03    0.00    0.15    0.03    0.45    0.09   0.21  
  7   98.69    0.04    0.01    0.20    0.04    0.61    0.13   0.28  
  8   98.31    0.05    0.01    0.25    0.05    0.79    0.17   0.37  
  9   97.92    0.06    0.01    0.30    0.06    0.98    0.22   0.46  
  10   97.50    0.08    0.02    0.34    0.07    1.18    0.27   0.55  
Crisis             
  1   100.00   -   -   -   -   -   -    -  
  2   93.83    0.05    0.40    0.34    0.01    0.18    4.62   0.57  
  3   93.69    0.16    0.26    0.93    0.03    0.37    4.00   0.56  
  4   93.40    0.19    0.19    1.29    0.02    0.60    3.82   0.49  
  5   93.31    0.22    0.15    1.47    0.02    0.74    3.65   0.43  
  6   93.25    0.24    0.13    1.58    0.01    0.84    3.56   0.39  
  7   93.20    0.25    0.13    1.66    0.01    0.91    3.49   0.35  
  8   93.16    0.26    0.13    1.73    0.01    0.95    3.43   0.32  
  9   93.12    0.27    0.16    1.79    0.01    0.99    3.38   0.29  
  10   93.08    0.27    0.19    1.84    0.01    1.02    3.33   0.27  
Post  Crisis             
  1   100.00   -   -   -   -   -   -    -  
  2   98.60    0.02    0.00    0.04    0.01    0.06    1.23   0.05  
  3   98.19    0.02    0.01    0.07    0.03    0.07    1.57   0.05  
  4   98.02    0.01    0.01    0.09    0.04    0.09    1.69   0.04  
  5   97.90    0.01    0.01    0.12    0.05    0.11    1.76   0.03  
  6   97.80    0.02    0.01    0.14    0.06    0.13    1.81   0.03  
  7   97.68    0.03    0.01    0.17    0.06    0.15    1.85   0.03  
  8   97.57    0.05    0.01    0.20    0.07    0.17    1.89   0.03  
  9   97.44    0.08    0.01    0.24    0.08    0.19    1.92   0.04  
   10   97.31    0.12    0.01    0.27    0.09    0.21    1.94   0.05  
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